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Abstract We present an overview of the decision-theoretic framework of statistical causality,
which is well-suited for formulating and solving problems of determining the effects of applied
causes. The approach is described in detail, and is related to and contrasted with other current
formulations, such as structural equation models and potential responses. Topics and applica-
tions covered include confounding, the effect of treatment on the treated, instrumental variables,
and dynamic treatment strategies.
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1 Introduction
After decades of neglect, recent years have seen a flowering of the field of sta-
tistical causality, with an impressive array of developments both theoretical and
applied. However there is as yet no one fully accepted foundational basis for
this enterprise. Rather, there is a variety of formal and informal frameworks
for framing and understanding causal questions, and hot discussion about their
relationships, merits and demerits: we might mention, among others, structural
equation modelling and path analysis (Wright 1921), potential response models
(Rubin 1978), functional models (Pearl 2009), and various forms of graphical rep-
resentation. This plethora of “foundations” leaves statistical causality in much
the same state of confusion as probability theory before Kolmogorov.
The aim of this overview paper is to add to the confusion by describing one par-
ticular approach, based on decision-theoretic principles, that its author considers
superior to the others (in this of course he is fully aligned with others’ attitudes
to their own works). I will present the main features of the approach, relate it to
and compare it with some other approaches, and show how it works in some sim-
ple applications. I consider this approach more straightforward philosophically
and mathematically (it requires only a very small extension to standard statistical
methods), and easier to comprehend and manipulate, than other approaches that
3
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introduce new ingredients and structures, such as potential responses or deter-
ministic functional relationships. While I do not expect wholesale conversion to
ths point of view, I hope that readers already knowledgeable in causal inference
will, at the very least, find it helpful to look at familiar topics through a fresh
pair of spectacles.
For further details and developments of the material in this paper, see Dawid (2000);
Dawid (2002); Dawid (2003); Didelez et al. (2006); Dawid (2007a); Dawid and Didelez (2008)
Dawid (2010a); Dawid (2010b); Dawid and Didelez (2010); Guo and Dawid (2010);
Dawid (2011); Geneletti and Dawid (2011); Dawid and Didelez (2012); Berzuini et al. (2012b)
Dawid (2012); Berzuini et al. (2012c); Dawid and Constantinou (2014). The lec-
ture notes Dawid (2007b) contain a fuller exposition of the decision-theoretic
approach.
Causality and agency
“Causality” has been a focus of interest for philosophers for millennia, but —
as befits any worthwhile philosophical conundrum — all this attention has not
resulted in a settled approach to understanding it. In Dawid (2010b) I reviewed
a variety of philosophical conceptions and theories, focusing particularly on that
which is most germane to my own approach: the agency theory of causality
(Price 1991; Hausman 1998; Woodward 2003; Woodward 2013). This interprets
causality as being all about how an external manipulation would affect a system:
for example, how the quality of the chemical product would respond to adjust-
ments of the lever that controls the pressure in the production process. Much of
Statistical Science—in particular, the whole subfield of Experimental Design—
aims to address exactly these kinds of questions about the effects of interventions
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on a system, which are indeed a major object of all scientific enquiry.
An important advantage of the agency approach is its clear separation of cause
and effect variables, resulting in the elimination of definitional ambiguities asso-
ciated with the possibility of reverse causation or common causes. But having
clean definitions is not enough for practical purposes: we must be able to relate
those definitions to properties of the empirical world. Whereas this is relatively
unproblematic in cases involving genuine experimentation, it becomes a major
headache when we can only observe a system in its natural habitat, and are un-
able to apply to it the interventions that are essential to understanding its causal
properties. The importance of making a clear distinction between intervening and
merely observing has been stressed by numerous authors, including Rubin (1978);
Meek and Glymour (1994); Spirtes et al. (2000); Pearl (2009). Most of the recent
emphasis of the enterprise of “statistical causality” focuses on observational sit-
uations, and attempts to identify conditions under which it is possible to extract
causal conclusions from them, and techniques for doing so.
Effects of causes and causes of effects
The emphasis in this work will be entirely on the problem of assessing the future
effects of an intervention in a system: that is, on identifying the “effects of
causes” (EoC). An entirely different problem is that of judging what might have
been the cause of an observed outcome: that is to say, identifying the “causes
of effects” (CoE). This is very much an issue in legal cases, which may seek to
assign responsibility or blame.
Most of the effort to date in statistical causality has focused on CoE problems,
an important exception being Pearl (2009) who explores both problems in detail.
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However, whereas Pearl, and such others who have dealt with CoE, have used
the identical mathematical machinery (in Pearl’s case, based on assumed func-
tional relationships) for both EoC and CoE, I do not consider this appropriate.
In Dawid (2000) I discussed the relationships and differences between these prob-
lems, and their requisite infrastructures, in some detail, and argued that, whereas
(unlike for EoC) some form of counterfactual logic appears unavoidable for as-
sessing CoE, the difficulties in appropriately modelling a CoE problem have been
underappreciated. Some discussion and analysis of CoE issues in the context of
using epidemiological data to address a legal case of toxic tort can be found in
Dawid (2011); Dawid et al. (2013); Dawid et al. (2014).
Plan of paper
I start in § 2 with a simple example that locates statistical causality firmly within
the purview of classical statistical decision analysis. Section 3 then explores some
variant formulations of this problem, including structural equations and poten-
tial responses. In § 4 these approaches are explored and compared in the familiar
context of statistical experimental design. Section 5 moves the discussion on to
the more problematic context of causal inference from observational data, and ex-
plores the meaning and representation of the important concept of “no confound-
ing”: from a decision-theoretic approach, this is usefully described in terms of
relationships between different “regimes” —e.g., interventional or observational
— under which data can, in principle at least, be gathered. It is shown how
this and similar requisite properties can be usefully expressed and manipulated
in terms of an extension of the probabilistic notion of conditional independence
to allow for both stochastic and non-stochastic variables. Section 6 develops
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the associated algebraic and graphical theory. In § 7 we introduce influence di-
agrams as useful graphical representations of causal problems, and relate these
to the use of directed acyclic graph representations as described by Pearl (2009).
The remainder of the paper explores, from the decision-theoretic perspective, a
number of important special applications. Section 9 examines the observational
identification of causal effects using sufficient covariates, propensity analysis and
“do-calculus”, and the possibility of identifying “the effect of treatment on the
treated”; § 10 considers the use of instrumental variables; and § 11 treats problems
where a sequence of actions can be applied, over time, in response to intermedi-
ate observations and outcomes. The discussion in § 12 expresses some scepticisms
about currently popular approaches that make unavoidable use of counterfactual
reasoning.
2 A Decision Problem
I have a headache and am considering whether or not to take two aspirin tablets.
It is generally accepted that aspirin has a beneficial effect on headaches: in some
sense — and it will be our task to try to make this more precise — taking aspirin
causes headaches to get better faster. The solution to my decision problem is thus
intimately bound up with the cause-effect relationship of aspirin on headache.
This observation leads naturally on to a suspicion that some part,1 at least,
of the enterprise of “statistical causality” might be fruitfully recast as a special
application of standard statistical decision analysis. However, this point of view
is not a currently popular one, and indeed there is a variety of other attempts to
1Specifically, the part that aims to understand the effects of applied causes (EoC); problems
of identifying the causes of observed effects (CoE) require a different approach.
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interpret causality in a statistical setting. We shall be considering the relation-
ships, similarities and differences between these, and hope to demonstrate that
the decision-theoretic approach is more natural, more straightforward, and more
useful than its competitors.
To formulate the decision problem, let the binary variable X denote whether
I take aspirin (X = 1) or not (X = 0), and let Y be the log-time it takes for my
headache to go away. I myself can choose X: it is a decision variable, and does
not have a probability distribution. Nevertheless, it is still meaningful to consider
my conditional distribution, Px say, for how the eventual response Y will turn
out, given that I choose X = x. For the moment we assume the distributions P0,
P1 to be known. Where we need to be definite, we shall (purely for simplicity)
take them to have the following normal probability density function:
p(y |X = x) = (2piσ2)−
1
2 exp−
(y − µx)
2
2σ2
, (1)
with a mean µ0 or µ1 according as x = 0 or 1, and variance σ
2 in either case.
The distribution P1 [resp., P0] can be interpreted as expressing my hypothetical
uncertainty about Y , if I were to decide on action X = 1 [resp., X = 0]. It
can incorporate various sources and types of uncertainty, including stochastic
effects of external influences arising and acting between the points of treatment
application and eventual response. The distributions P1 and P0 are all that
is needed to address my decision problem: I simply need to compare the two
different hypothetical distributions for Y , decide which one I prefer, and take the
associated decision.
One possible comparison of P1 and P0 might be in terms their respective means,
µ1 and µ0; the “effect” of taking aspirin, rather than nothing, might then be
quantified by means of the change in the expected response, δ := µ1 − µ0. Al-
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ternatively, we might look at the difference of the means of Z = eY under the
two possible treatments: eσ
2/2(eµ1 − eµ2). Or we might compare the variances of
Z under the two treatments. Any such comparison of an appropriately chosen
feature of the two hypothetical distributions of Y can be regarded as a summary
of the causal effect of taking aspirin (as against taking nothing).
More formally, we might apply statistical decision analysis (see e.g. Raiffa (1968))
to structure and solve this decision problem. Suppose that I quantify the loss that
I will suffer if my headache lasts y minutes by means of a real-valued loss function,
L(y). If I were to take the aspirin, my expected loss would be EY∼P1{L(Y )};
if not, it would be EY∼P0{L(Y )}. The principles of statistical decision analy-
sis now direct me to choose the treatment leading to the smaller expected loss.
A trivial but fundamentally important point is that, whatever loss function is
used, this solution will only involve the two hypothetical distributions, P1 and
P0, for Y , conditional on taking either action. The “effect of treatment” might
be measured by the reduction in expected loss, EP0{L(Y )} − EP1{L(Y )}: and
the correct decision will be to take aspirin just when this reduction is positive.
Although there is no uniquely appropriate measure of “the effect of treatment”,
in the rest of this paper for simplicity we shall focus on the difference of the means
of the two hypothetical distributions: δ := EP1(Y )− EP0(Y ).
3 Alternative Formulations
3.1 Decision-theoretic (DT) model
The essential ingredients of the decision-theoretic analysis above were the two
hypothetical distributions for Y , conditional on X = 0 and on X = 1. These
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were specialised to be normal:
Y |X = x ∼ N (µx, σ
2). (2)
We term this a stochastic or decision-theoretic (DT) model. In this formulation,
the term average causal effect (ACE) simply denotes the difference of the means
of the two hypothetical distributions for Y , µ1 − µ0.
3.2 Simple structural equation (SSE) model
An alternative way in which the assumptions of (2) are very often expressed is
as follows:
Y = µX + E (3)
where
E ∼ N (0, σ2) (4)
and it is implicit that the “error” E is independent of X. A system of equations
such as (3), which may contain hundreds of relationships representing response
(“endogenous”) variables as functions of other (both endogenous and “exoge-
nous”) variables as well as of external “error” variables such as E, together with
associated explicit or implicit assumptions about the joint distribution of the error
terms, constitutes a simple Structural Equation (SSE) model. Such models are
popular in econometrics and other fields as representations of causal structures.
The assumptions of the SSE model (3) clearly imply the distributional prop-
erties of the DT model (1). Does this mean the SSE model is equivalent to the
DT model? To assume this would be to ignore the additional algebraic structure
of (3), whereby Y is represented as a deterministic mathematical function of the
two variables X and E. Unlike the distributional formulation of (1), in (3) all
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the uncertainty is compressed into the single variable E, via (4). If we take (3)
and its ingredients seriously, we can get more out of it.
It is common, and indeed seems very natural, implicitly to interpret (3) as
follows. The values of X and E are assigned separately (by the decision maker
and by Nature, respectively), and Y is then determined by the equation. In
this case, given that E takes value e, then if I set X to x, Y will take value
yx := µx + e. That is, I will observe the variable Yx := µx + E. We can regard
Yx as the potential response to the hypothetical setting X = x. It will become
the actual response, Y , when indeed X = x: Y = YX = µX + E. Note that,
in this interpretation, when in fact I set X = 1, the counterfactual2 response
Y0 = µ0 + E to X = 0 is still a well-defined function of the ingredients of model
(3).
With the above interpretations, if I were to switch my decision from X = 1 to
X = 0, then Y would switch from Y1 = µ1+E to Y0 = µ0+E, with the identical
E. The “causal effect” of this switch might then be measured by Y1−Y0, which in
this case is the constant µ1−µ0. This is a purely algebraic comparison, unrelated
to the stochastic properties of the model. It may be termed an individual causal
effect (ICE).
Note that all these manipulations rely fundamentally on the implicit assump-
tion that the value of E remains fixed, irrespective of which decision I take. Such
an assumption simply has no counterpart in the DT model (2).
2since predicated on a hypothesis that runs counter to known facts
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3.3 Extended structural equation (ESE) model
An extension of the SSE model (3) is given by:
Y = µX + EX (5)
where we now have a pair E = (E0, E1) of error variables, having a bivariate
distribution, assumed independent of X. In particular, when X = 0 we have
Y = Y0 := µ0+E0, with E0 having its initially assigned distribution; and similarly
Y = Y1 := µ1 + E1 when X = 1. And Y = YX .
Suppose we model the pair of errors E as bivariate normal with standard
normal margins:
E ∼ N (0,Σ), (6)
where Σ (2 × 2) has diagonal entries σ2 and off-diagonal entries ρσ2. Then (no
matter what the correlation ρ may be) the DT model (1) for Y given X will
be obtained. But again, if we take the algebraic structure seriously, and further
suppose that the value of E is unaffected by the choice made for X, we can go
further and define potential responses Yx := µx+Ex, as well as the ICE, Y1−Y0,
which in this case is a random quantity, µ1 − µ0 + E1 − E0.
It is important to note that the relationship between the ESE model and the
induced DT model is many-one: the dependence structure (here embodied in the
correlation ρ) does not enter into the induced DT model.
3.4 Potential response (PR) model
As seen above, starting from a structural equation model (whether simple or
extended), we can define the pair Y = (Y0, Y1) of potential responses, and derive
its bivariate distribution, in terms of the ingredients of that model. For our ESE
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model above, the implied distribution of Y is
Y ∼ N (µ,Σ) (7)
with µ := (µ0, µ1). Both the value and the distribution of Y are regarded as
independent of the applied treatment X.
We might alternatively start at this point, simply taking the pair Y as a
primitive ingredient of our model, having a bivariate distribution (for example,
that of (7)), and again assuming that both the value and the distribution of Y will
be unchanged if we change the value of X. This is the general potential response
(PR) model. The underlying philosophical conception is that both potential
responses are real and coexist — even though it is logically impossible to observe
both of them together.
Starting from a PR model we can recover a DT model: in particular, if we
start with (7) we recover (2). But again, this relationship is many-one.
3.5 Functional model
Mathematically, the models introduced in § 3.2, § 3.3 § 3.4 all have the following
common functional form:
Y = f(X,U), (8)
where X is a decision variable representing the cause of interest; Y is the effect of
interest; U is a further extraneous random variable whose value and distribution
are taken as independent of X; and f is a deterministic function of its arguments.
In the ESE model (5), we can take U = E and f(x, (e0, e1)) = µx+ex; the SSE
model of (3) is the degenerate case of this having U = E and f(x, e) = µx + e.
In the case of a PR model, we can formally take U to be the pair (Y0, Y1), and
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the function f to be given by:
f(x, (y0, y1)) = yx. (9)
In all the above applications, the variable U typically represents a somewhat
imaginary quantity, that does not correspond to any variable observable in the
empirical world. Indeed, were that to be made a requirement, the application
of functional models would be limited to the very special situation of complete
determinism, with the pair of real variables (X,U) fully determining Y .
A general functional model of the form (8) is mathematically equivalent to a PR
model, if we define Y0 = f(0, U), Y1 = f(1, U). We thus see that (mathematically
if not necessarily in terms of their interpretation) PR models, ESE models and
general functional models need not be distinguished. Further, any functional
model determines a DT model: under model (8) the relevant distribution of
Y , given X = x, is simply the marginal distribution of f(x,U). Conversely,
given any DT model, Y |X = x ∼ Px, we can construct a functional model
corresponding to it in this way: one simple way is as a potential response model
(9), in which the marginal distribution of Yx is Px. However, in contrast to
the essentially unique cross-correspondence between the other models considered
above, the functional representation of a DT model is far from unique—as can
again be seen, for example, from the arbitrariness of the dependence parameter
ρ in the PR representation (7) of the stochastic model (2), which can never be
identified from data.
4 Causal Inference from Experimental Studies
Having set out a variety of formulations of my basic decision problem, we now
address the question: How might I gather and use data to help identify the
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required ingredients? From the DT perspective, I need to assess my hypothetical
distributions P0 and P1 for Y , under either treatment choice. These assessments
should be informed by (that is, conditioned on) whatever relevant information I
may have: for example, the responses observed for other similar headaches (my
own, or those of other people), that received one of the two treatments.
We initially restrict attention to the simplest case. Suppose I can observe two
groups of people. Each group consists of individuals I can regard as similar to
(technically, exchangeable with) me in all features relevant to their development of
headaches and reaction to treatment. The first group are then all assigned active
treatment (aspirin): X = 1; while the second group gets the control treatment
(no aspirin), X = 0.3 Finally I observe the responses of all individuals: let Yxi
denote the response of the ith individual receiving treatment x.
4.1 DT approach
Under the above assumptions, I can model the responses of the treated individuals
as being randomly drawn from P1, and likewise the responses of the untreated
individuals as drawn from P0. I can then use completely standard statistical
methods to estimate and compare (in any way I choose) the two distributions
P1 and P0. In particular, I have access to all the ingredients required for my
3The usual operational method is, first to form a single group of individuals “like me”,
and, secondly, to randomise the assignment of treatment to its individuals; the resulting treat-
ment/control groups will then each still be exchangeable with me on their pre-treatment charac-
teristics. The second stage by itself ensures internal validity : the treated and untreated groups
should be comparable with each other; but without the first stage we will not have external
validity , permitting generalisation beyond the data to external cases of interest — in this case,
myself.
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stochastic decision problem.
For example, under model (2), we model
Yxi ∼ N (µx, σ
2), (10)
all independently; and can then base inference about the difference δ = µ1−µ0 on
Student’s t-distribution. All this is the bread and butter of the most elementary
courses in Statistics. Here we have however emphasised — as may be more rarely
done — the assumptions needed to justify the relevance of this inference to the
decision problem I face.
4.2 Other approaches
Suppose now we take the ESE model of (5) seriously (this includes the simpler
SSE model (3) as the special case E0 = E1, or, equivalently, ρ = 1). Because that
model implies all the distributional properties of (2), I can still do all that I did
in § 4.1 above, and so use the data to help solve my decision problem. But now I
might want to do more. For example, I might want to say something about the
distribution of my individual causal effect, ICE = µ1 − µ0 + E1 − E0. Can I use
the data to help me in this?
Well, the mean of the ICE is just δ = µ1 − µ0, which I can estimate, as
above. But its variance is 2(1 − ρ)σ2. While I can estimate σ2 from my data,
the dependence on the correlation ρ is problematic: I could only estimate ρ if I
had observations on bivariate pairs, Y = (Y0, Y1) — corresponding to observing
both potential outcomes for the same individual. Since each individual receives
just one of the two treatments, the full pair Y is, logically, always unobservable,
and there is simply no way I can estimate ρ. In particular, I have no way of
distinguishing observationally between the general ESE model (5) and the SSE
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model (3). However, these have different implications for var(ICE), which is
2(1− ρ)σ2 for ESE, and 0 for SSE.
In like fashion, were I to be interested in the mean of the “ratio ICE”, viz.
E(Y1/Y0); or the estimate of my ICE after having taken aspirin and observed
response Y = y, viz. E(Y1 − Y0 |X = 1, Y = y) = (1 − ρ)y + (ρµ1 − µ0); these
seemingly innocuous queries could not be addressed by any data I could ever
collect, since they all depend on the unknowable value of ρ.
As the ESE model is a special case of a PR model, or a general functional model,
all the above caveats apply to those models also. We can thus divide putative
causal inferences from such a model into sheep — those that depend only on the
marginal distributions, P0 and P1, of the individual potential responses Y0 and
Y1, and are thus identifiable from data — and goats — those that do not, and
so are not identifiable. For example, any putative causal inference that makes
essential use of var(ICE) is a goat.
It is all too easy to neglect this distinction, and attempt to make a goat-like
inference. Given a fully specified ESE/PR/functional model this will be mathe-
matically possible, and it may not be noticed that the answer would be different
for a mathematically distinct model that is observationally entirely equivalent to
this one because it has the same marginal distributions. Such an apparent causal
inference is, to say the least, misleading.
4.3 Treatment-unit additivity
The ESE model (5) would represent the data as
Yxi = µx + Exi. (11)
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For the special case of an SSE model (3), this becomes
Yxi = µx + Ei, (12)
a sum of one term, µx, depending only on the treatment x applied, and another,
Ei, depending only on the unit i to which it is applied. This property is termed
treatment-unit additivity (TUA). It is entirely equivalent to the property that the
ICE, Y1 − Y0, has the identical value (viz., µ1 − µ0) across all individuals.
One reason we might like the TUA assumption is as follows. So far I have
had to assume that the individuals on whom I have data are “like me” — in
particular, we all have the same distribution for our error term E. But this is
often unrealistic, since e.g. a clinical trial will typically have stringent recruitment
criteria, which I would not satisfy. However, I can relax model (12), so as not to
require that my own E be drawn from the same distribution as the (Ei) in the
data (for example, it could have a higher mean or variance). But since my own
ICE is still µ1 − µ0, which is still estimable from the data, the causal inference
about my ICE is unaffected by this relaxation of the SSE model — though it
does still rely on TUA.
However an alternative decision-theoretic analysis (which thus does not require
TUA) is as follows.4 Because of different selection criteria, my personal hypo-
thetical distribution Px for my response Y , if I take treatment X = x, is allowed
be different from P ∗x , the distribution of Y for the individuals in my data who
receive treatment X = x. But suppose (for example) I can model its mean µx as
related to the mean µ∗x of P
∗
x by µx = µ
∗
x + γ for some γ that does not depend
on x. Then my own ACE µ1 − µ0 = µ
∗
1 − µ
∗
0 is estimable from the data.
4See Dawid (2000) § 8.1 for a more detailed account.
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4.3.1 Neyman and Fisher Since there is no observational way of distin-
guishing between the SSE model, for which TUA holds, and the more general
ESE model, for which it does not, the arguments in § 4.2 would classify any at-
tempt at causal inference that is dependent on the assumption of TUA as a goat.
In this light it is interesting to revisit the ill-tempered debate between Neyman
and Fisher in Neyman (1935).
The essence of Neyman’s model5 involves an experiment in which various treat-
ments t = 1, . . . , T can be applied to various experimental units u = 1, . . . , U , for
example plots in a field, which might themselves be described in more detail: for
example, in a “randomised blocks” layout, u = (i, j) (i = 1, . . . .I; j = 1, . . . , J)
for the jth plot in the ith row. The treatments are applied to the units according
to a randomisation scheme taking account of the structure of the units. In what
is considered to be the first use of a potential response formulation in Statis-
tics, Neyman introduces ytu to represent the response that would be observed on
unit u, if it were to receive treatment t — with the values (ytu) for fixed u, as t
varies, regarded as having simultaneous existence, even though at most one can
be observed. Neyman regards the collection of the (ytu), for all t and u, as the
“unknown parameter”. Statistical inference is based on the distribution of the
observed responses brought about by the random assignment of treatments to
units.
Neyman introduces the null hypothesis:
H∗0 : the value of yt. does not depend on t
where yt. denotes the average of the ytu over the U units in the experiment. That
is, yt. is the average response that would be obtained if treatment t were applied
5We use different notation, and ignore certain elaborations irrelevant for current purposes.
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to all the experimental units, and his null hypothesis is that this would be the
same for every treatment — allowing, however, that there could be unit-level
differences, that just happen to average out.6 Neyman’s analysis (corrected and
extended by Wilk and Kempthorne (1955)) shows that, for certain designs, such
as the Latin square, the standard F -test is a valid test of his H∗0 only under the
assumption of treatment-unit additivity — in which case, it may be noted, H∗0
becomes equivalent to
H∗∗0 : for each unit u, the value of ytu does not depend on t.
Fisher criticised H∗0 , and the associated test, as based on an entirely inappropriate
formulation of the phrase “no differences between the treatments”.7
From the point of view of the DT approach, it is troubling that, according to
Neyman, the standard F -test is or is not valid according as whether or not we
assume TUA — a distinction without any empirically observable consequences.
Neyman’s analysis must therefore be classified as a goat.
5 Observational Studies and Confounding
We have so far treated X as a decision variable, under the control of a human
agent rather than Nature — not merely for the actual decision problem I myself
face, but likewise for the experimental individuals used to supply inputs for my
problem. But often genuine experimentation is impossible, and we have to rely on
data already collected, in circumstances over which we had no control — in par-
6but need not do so if averaged over some other collection of units
7Fisher’s arguments are characteristically intuitive rather than formal — though no less
compelling for that — and he is often taken as having favoured H∗∗0 , which is still phrased in
terms of potential responses, as the appropriate null hypothesis. However my own reading of
his remarks does not find any clear commitment to a PR interpretation.
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ticular, no control as to who received which treatment. Such observational studies
raise serious problems of interpretation and relevance, and great care is needed
in drawing conclusions from them (Rosenbaum 2010; Madigan et al. 2014).
So suppose again I have data on a group of individuals whom I can regard
as exchangeable with me — but now for whom treatments have already been
assigned, I know not how. For each individual I have information (say, for one
headache episode) on the treatment applied X, and the duration Y (and, typi-
cally, also on some further relevant variables). Since I did not have the option
to choose which treatment to apply, X is no longer a decision variable: it has
become a random variable.
A natural question is whether I can still use (an estimate of) the distribution
of Y , for those individuals who received treatment X = 1, as a proxy for my
own hypothetical distribution P1 (and similarly for X = 0). Now in order for
this to be possible, I must be able to regard the treated patients as similar to
(exchangeable with) me, as regards relevant features existing prior to treatment
choice. But even though this exchangeability may have been assumed at the
level of the whole group, it does not follow that it will hold for the subgroup who
got treated, since the treatment decision may itself have been correlated with
these features — for example, aspirin may have been given only for really bad
headaches. This is the problem of confounding , which obstructs straightforward
causal interpretation of observational data. We shall have no confounding only
when I can, simultaneously, consider myself as exchangeable, both with those
patients who received aspirin, and also with those who received none. This then
implies that those two groups of patients must be exchangeable with each other,8
8That is, external validity for each group separately implies internal validity.
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which in turn requires that the way in which treatments were applied was obliv-
ious to (independent of) any features of the individuals that could be relevant to
their reactions to treatment. The easiest way to ensure this is by randomisation.
Although we are here assuming this was not possible, we can sometimes (albeit
rarely) attempt to argue that the data can nevertheless be treated as if they had
been randomised.
For a functional model Y = f(X,U), the defining property of “no confounding”
is typically taken as requiring independence (in the observational data) between
X and U : in the notation of Dawid (1979) (see § 6 below),
X ⊥⊥U. (13)
This is trivially equivalent to U ⊥⊥X, i.e. the observational distribution of U given
X = x does not depend on x, thus mimicking a property already assumed for the
case that X is my decision variable. For an ESE model the above requirement
translates as X ⊥⊥E, and as X ⊥⊥Y for a PR model. (However, since U , E and
Y typically do not correspond to any empirically observable variables, the mental
exercise required to assess whether the above independence properties hold can
be perplexing.)
In the next section we consider just why (13) might be considered as express-
ing “no confounding”, and extend the analysis to the DT interpretation of this
concept.
5.1 Regimes
A helpful way to think about (absence of) confounding is in terms of different
data-generating regimes and their relationships.
In the above example we can distinguish three such regimes. One of these is
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the observational regime, under which the available data have been observed.
Then there are two interventional regimes, corresponding to the circumstance
in which an external intervention is made to impose one of the two treatments. It
is helpful to introduce a non-stochastic variable FX , with values 0, 1 and ∅ (read
as “idle”): FX = 0 labels the interventional regime with X = 0; FX = 1 labels
the interventional regime with X = 1; while FX = ∅ labels the observational
regime. There will be a joint distribution of all relevant variables for each of
these regimes. Thus FX has the status of a statistical parameter, indexing which
distribution we are referring to. Note that (assuming intervention is perfectly
successful), X = x with probability 1 in regime FX = x (x = 0, 1), whereas X
will be a genuinely stochastic variable in regime FX = ∅.
We have previously interpreted a functional model, and its specialisations such
as an ESE or PR model, as incorporating an implicit assumption of “stability”:
that the relevant variable U should have the same value, and hence the same
distribution, no matter which treatment is applied. In fact this assumption is
not quite enough: we further need to assume that U has the same distribution,
irrespective of the regime that is operating. This is necessary if we are to justify
transfer (under suitable conditions) of information from the observational regime
to the interventional regimes. Thus suppose (13) holds. We desire to compute,
and contrast, the distributions of the response Y under the two interventional
regimes. Under intervention with active treatment, Y = f(1, U) with U having
its distribution under FX = 1. In the observational regime, we can estimate the
conditional distribution of Y given X = 1, which is that of f(1, U) given X = 1
under FX = ∅. On account of (13) (supposed to apply in the observational
regime), this is the same as the marginal distribution of f(1, U) under FX =
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∅. But under our extended stability assumptions, U has the same distribution
in all regimes, so this is indeed the same as the desired distribution of Y =
f(1, U) under FX = 1. We have thus shown that, taking together (13) and the
assumptions of stability, we can deduce “no confounding”, expressed as
(Y |FX = x) ≈ (Y |X = x;FX = ∅) (x = 0, 1), (14)
where the symbol ≈ denotes “has the same distribution as”.
At this point we note that the left-hand side of (14) refers to what we have
termed the “hypothetical distribution”, Px, of Y , under intervention with X = x;
while the right-hand side refers to a conditional distribution that is, in principle,
estimable from empirical data. All the special ingredients of the functional model
have evaporated, and we are left with an expression that is fully meaningful within
the DT framework. And within that framework we can simply and directly take
property (14) (however it may be justified) as the appropriate expression of “no
confounding”.
5.2 Conditional independence
An alternative way of expressing (14) is as follows. First note that, since X = x
with probability 1 under regime FX = x, (14) is is equivalent to
(Y |X = x;FX = x) ≈ (Y |X = x;FX = ∅) (x = 0, 1). (15)
This expresses the conditional distribution of Y , given X = x, as a “modular
component”, that can be transferred without change betwen observational and
interventional settings. This modular interpretation of “causality” offers a useful
pragmatic take on a slippery philosophical concept.
The distributional identity (15) can also be considered as an expression of the
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conditional independence property (Dawid 1979; Dawid 1980):
Y ⊥⊥FX |X, (16)
which says that the distribution of Y , given information both on the value of
X and on the regime FX under which that value arose, is in fact the same
for all the regimes. In this way we have converted a causal property into a
probabilistic one (albeit involving the non-random regime variable FX). Since
there is a well-established theory of conditional independence (see § 6 below), this
is a fruitful reinterpretation that will be particularly helpful for both describing
and manipulating causal properties. So henceforth we will work with (16), and
its DT interpretation, as our formal expression of “no confounding”.
6 Conditional Independence and Graphs
In this section we recapitulate various aspects of the mathematical theory of con-
ditional independence that will be useful for manipulating causal concepts. For
further detail see Dawid (1979); Dawid (1980); Dawid (2002); Constantinou (2013).
For random variables X, Y , . . . , having joint distribution P , we say X is
independent of Y given Z, and write X ⊥⊥Y |Z, to mean that the distribution of
X, given (Y,Z) = (y, z) depends only on the value z of Z. More formally:
Definition 1 [Conditional independence] We say X is conditionally inde-
pendent of Y given Z, and write X ⊥⊥Y |Z, if, for any measurable set A in the
range of X, there exists a function w(Z) of Z alone such that P (X ∈ A |Y,Z) =
w(Z) [P -almost surely]. ✷
When we need to specify explicitly the underlying joint distribution P we write
e.g. X ⊥⊥Y |Z [P ]. Independence, X ⊥⊥Y , is the special case of conditional in-
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dependence when the conditioning variable Z is trivial.
6.1 Axioms of conditional independence
Among the general properties of probabilistic conditional independence are the
following (Dawid 1979). Here we write W  Y to mean that W is a function of
Y .
P1 “Symmetry” : X ⊥⊥Y |Z ⇒ Y ⊥⊥X |Z
P2 : X ⊥⊥Y |X
P3 “Decomposition” : X ⊥⊥Y |Z, W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥W |Z
P4 “Weak union” : X ⊥⊥Y |Z, W  Y ⇒ X ⊥⊥Y | (W,Z)
P5 “Contraction” :
X ⊥⊥Y |Z
and
X ⊥⊥W | (Y,Z)


⇒ X ⊥⊥ (Y,W ) |Z.
(The descriptive terms are those given by Pearl (1988), Chapter 3).
It is possible to derive many further properties of CI by regarding P1 to P5
as axioms for a logical system, rather than calling on more specific properties of
probability distributions.
6.2 Extension to non-stochastic variables
In order for Definition 1 to make sense we must be able to talk about distribu-
tions for X, which thus has to be a random variable; but (subject to appropriate
interpretation of the “almost sure” qualification) Y and Z need not be. In partic-
ular, this is the case for expression (16), our interpretation of “no confounding”,
which involves the non-stochastic regime indicator variable FX .
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We must exercise a little care when applying the notation and theory of § 6.1
to non-stochastic variables, to ensure that these always appear, explicitly or im-
plicitly, as conditioning variables. Nevertheless, suitably interpreted, properties
P1–P5 do still hold (Dawid 1980; Constantinou 2013). In fact any deduction
made using them will be valid, so long as, in both premisses and conclusions, no
non-stochastic variables appear in the left-most term in a conditional indepen-
dence statement (we are allowed to violate this condition in intermediate steps
of an argument). So we can apply P1–P5 freely, even in the presence of non-
stochastic variables, so long only as we do not attempt to derive any obviously
meaningless assertion.
6.3 Graphical representation
There is a remarkable and technically valuable analogy between conditional inde-
pendence properties holding between random variables, and separation properties
of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) (Lauritzen et al. 1990). This enables us to use
graphical methods to streamline probabilistic manipulations.
The graphical analogue of probabilistic conditional independence is the follow-
ing somewhat complex separation property. Let A, B, C be sets of nodes of
the DAG D. We first form the subgraph D′ of D that contains only the nodes
in A, B and C, together with all their ancestors in D, and all their connecting
arrows: this is the relevant ancestral DAG . Next, whenever two nodes in D′ have
a common child but are not already joined by an arrow (are “unmarried”), we
insert an undirected edge between them, and then convert all remaining edges to
be undirected by dropping the arrowheads: this produces the moralised ancestral
graph, G′. Finally, in the undirected graph G′, we check whether every connected
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path from a node in A to one in B intersects C. If so, we say C d-separates
A from B,9 and write A ⊥D B |C. It can be shown that, at a purely formal
level, and with  now interpreted as “is a subset of”, ⊆, this separation property
satisfies Axioms P1–P5 of § 6.1
Now suppose that each node v of D has an associated random variable Xv.
Denote (Xv : v ∈ A) by XA. We say a joint distribution P for all these variables
satisfies the local directed Markov property with respect to D if, for every node v,
Xv ⊥⊥Xnd(v) |Xpa(v), (17)
where (using a self-explanatory analogy with a genetic pedigree) pa(v) denotes
the set of “parents” of node v, and nd(v) its “non-descendents”, in D. In
this case it can be shown that, whenever we find A ⊥D B |C (by inspection
of the DAG), we can deduce the probabilistic conditional independence property
XA⊥⊥XB |XC [P ]. We term this the moralisation criterion.
As an example, the directed acyclic graph (DAG) D of Figure 1 describes
the relationships between the evidence and other variables figuring in a criminal
trial (Dawid and Evett 1997). The graph is constructed so that the each node
corresponds to a variable in the problem, and the assumed dependence structure
of the variables satisfies the local directed Markov property: each variable is
supposed probabilistically conditionally independent of its non-descendents in
the graph, conditional on its graph parents. For example, the distribution of
Y 1 (measured properties of a tuft of fibres found at the scene), given all other
variables, is supposed fully determined by the values of X3 (properties of the
suspect’s jumper) and of A (an indicator of whether or not the fibres came from
9The name refers to an alternative, but equivalent, way of expressing this separation property,
as described by Pearl (1986); Verma and Pearl (1990).
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the suspect’s jumper). Likewise, the distribution of B (who left blood on the
jumper?), given all variables other than Y 2 (the type of that blood) and R
(whether or not the blood pattern was a spray), in fact only depends on the
values of N (the number of offenders) and C (whether or not the suspect was
an offender). Such assessments can often be made at a qualitative level, before
attempting numerical specification of probabilities. In turn, that specification is
simplified because we only need to describe the conditional distribution for each
variable given its graph parents.
Suppose now we wish to query whether (B,R)⊥⊥ (G1, Y 1) | (A,N). The rel-
evant ancestral graph D′ is shown in Figure 2, and its moralised version G′ in
Figure 3. We note that in G′ it is impossible to trace a path from either of
B or R to either G1 or Y 1 without passing through either A or N . Thus
(B,R) ⊥D (G1, Y 1) | (A,N). From this we deduce the probabilistic conditional
independence property (B,R)⊥⊥ (G1, Y 1) | (A,N).
Caution: Although every DAG thus describes some collection of conditional
independence properties, and can be used to manipulate these, by no means every
such collection can be represented by a DAG. In full generality, we may need to
use algebraic manipulations, successively applying the CI axioms P1–P5 to derive
the implicit consequences of an assumed collection of conditional independencies.
6.3.1 Markov equivalence Distinct DAGs can have identical separation
properties, and so represent identical collections of conditional independencies.
They are then termed Markov equivalent .
The skeleton of a DAG D is the undirected graph obtained by ignoring the
directions of the arrows on the edges of D. An immorality in D is a configuration
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of the form a→ c← b, where a and b are parents of a common child c but neither
a→ b nor b→ a.
Theorem 1 (Frydenberg (1990); Verma and Pearl (1991)) Two DAGs D0
and D1 on the same vertex set V are Markov equivalent if and only if they have
the same skeleton and the same immoralities.
Example 1 There are just three possible DAGs on two nodes:
(i). A→ B
(ii). A← B
(iii). A B.
Since DAGs (i) and (ii) have the same skeleton, and neither has any immoralities,
they are Markov equivalent: indeed, they embody no conditional independence
properties whatsoever. However, DAG (iii), which has a different skeleton, em-
bodies the non-trivial conditional independence restriction A⊥⊥B. ✷
Example 2 Consider the following DAGs on three nodes:
(i). A→ B → C
(ii). A← B ← C
(iii). A← B → C
(iv). A→ B ← C.
These all have the same skeleton. However, whereas DAGs (i), (ii) and (iii) have
no immoralities, (iv) has one immorality. Consequently, (i), (ii) and (iii) are
Markov equivalent to each other, but (iv) is not Markov equivalent to these. In-
deed, (i), (ii) and (iii) all express the conditional independence propertyA⊥⊥C |B,
whereas (iv) expresses the marginal independence property A⊥⊥C. ✷
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7 Causal Interpretations of DAGs
It is common, and appears very natural, to want to interpret an arrow a→ b in a
DAG as representing some kind of “direct causal dependence” of b on a. But this
is a potentially dangerous move, since there is nothing in the DAG semantics, as
presented above, to justify it. We prefer a different way of introducing causal-
ity into a DAG: by explicitly representing regime indicators,10 and applying the
moralisation criterion to the resulting influence diagram (ID), a DAG contain-
ing both stochastic and non-stochastic variables. As a simple example, the “no
confounding” property (16) is represented by the ID of Figure 4.
Consider now the effect of reversing the arrow from X to Y , as shown in
Figure 5. Without the intervention node FX , the two graphs would have been
Markov equivalent (as was the case for Example 1, (i) and (ii)). Now however
we can easily see that they no longer represent equivalent assumptions since,
although they have the same skeleton, they have different immoralities. Figure 5
expresses the marginal independence property Y ⊥⊥FX , and thus makes it explicit
that the marginal distribution of Y is the same, no matter whether, or how, X
is subjected to intervention. That is, X has no effect on Y (in any regime).
8 Pearlian DAGs
Consider the DAG of Figure 6. Interpreted purely stochastically, it is nothing but
a representation of the following conditional independence properties: A⊥⊥B;
D⊥⊥ (A,B,C); and E⊥⊥ (A,B) | (C,D); together with all other properties, such
as E⊥⊥B | (A,C), deducible from these using P1–P5 (or, equivalently, readable
10This develops on an idea introduced by Spirtes et al. (2000): see also Pearl (2009);
Lauritzen (2000).
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off the DAG using the moralisation criterion).
In the approach of Pearl (2009), a DAG such as Figure 6 is taken to repre-
sent causal properties. A helpful way of understanding Pearl’s interpretation is
to consider the DAG as a shorthand for the influence diagram of Figure 7, in
which a non-stochastic intervention node has been associated with every stochas-
tic node. Using the moralisation criterion, we can read off from this augmented
DAG that, for example, C ⊥⊥ (D,FA, FB , FD, FE) | (A,B,FC ). For FC = ∅ (the
only non-trivial case), this says that the ‘natural’ conditional distribution of C,
given A and B, is not further affected by additional conditioning on the value
of D, nor by whether or not any or all of A, B, D or E arose naturally or by
intervention. Similar properties hold for the other domain variables. In partic-
ular, we can see that the conditional distribution for a node, given its domain
parents, when it is allowed to arise naturally, remains unchanged when its par-
ents are set by intervention (and is thus a modular component, invariant across
different regimes). The augmented DAG thus automatically encodes (via moral-
isation semantics) the assumptions made externally by Pearl, without requiring
any new ingredients or concepts; and further makes it easy to read off their im-
plications directly. It also makes it clear that, when endowed with Pearl’s causal
interpretation, DAGs that are prima facie Markov equivalent (such as X → Y
and X ← Y ) are not causally equivalent, since their augmented forms will not
be Markov equivalent. For all these reasons, explicit use of augmented DAGs is
to be preferred over Pearl’s shorthand form, which in any case courts confusion
with the purely stochastic interpretation of a DAG.
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Caution: A Pearlian DAG model, or its augmented DAG equivalent, is justi-
fied only to the extent that it models the actual the behaviour of the world in the
setting to which it is intended to apply. In particular, we must ask whether or not
the various interventional situations are indeed related to the non-interventional
one in the specific way represented by the DAG. Since such considerations nec-
essarily involve cross-regime comparisons, no assessment of their appropriateness
can be made on the basis of purely observational data.
9 Identifying Causal Effects
Suppose we are interested in the “causal effect” of a treatment variable T on
a response variable Y . In the DT framework, this requires us to identify, and
contrast, the two interventional distributions: P1, for Y in regime FT = 1, and
P0, for Y in regime FT = 0. For simplicity we again confine attention to the
average causal effect
ACE := E(Y |FT = 1)− E(Y |FT = 0). (18)
With only observational data, gathered in regime FT = ∅, we will not be in a
position directly to assess these interventional distributions of Y . We will thus
need to make assumptions to justify and guide computation of the ACE from such
data. Since any such assumptions will have to relate distributions across distinct
regimes, they will not be empirically testable if we only have observational data.
It will however be important to present some sort of convincing argument for the
suitability of any assumptions imposed.
At the simplest level, we might assume “no confounding”: Y ⊥⊥FT |T . In
this case we could simply estimate the observational conditional distribution of
Y |T = t, FT = ∅, and take that as the desired interventional distribution of
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Y |FT = t (t = 0, 1). Thus under this assumption we will have
ACE = E(Y |T = 1, FT = ∅)− E(Y |T = 1, FT = ∅), (19)
which is straighforwardly estimable from observational data.
However, in many realistic contexts the “no confounding” property will be
simply unbelievable: that is to say, we will have confounding : Y 6⊥⊥FT |T . Then
(19) might fail. Note that this definition of confounding does not require the
existence of what are often called confounding variables, or confounders. But
to make progress in identifying ACE we will typically have to introduce further
variables, with appropriate properties.
9.1 Sufficient covariates
A variable U is a pre-treatment variable if it exists and is (in principle) observable
prior to the point at which the treatment decision is taken. In this case its value,
and so its distribution, must be the same under both interventional regimes,
FT = 0 and FT = 1. It will frequently (though not invariably) also be the case
that its distribution can be considered the same in the relevant observational
regime FT = ∅. Then we will have
U ⊥⊥FT . (20)
Such a variable is a covariate.
9.2 Unconfounder
When we can not assume “no confounding”, we might be able to tell an alter-
native, more convincing, story, in terms of a (typically multivariate) covariate
U : claiming that we will have no residual confounding , after conditioning on U .
Statistical Causality 35
Formally,
Y ⊥⊥FT | (U, T ). (21)
For example, if our data arise from an observational study on patients treated
by a certain doctor, who might be allocating treatment according to his own
observations U of the general health of the patient, it could be reasonable to
suppose that, conditionally on U , we would have no residual confounding. If
we can observe U , we can then use the observational distribution of Y given
(U, T = t) as the distribution of Y given U in the interventional regime FT = t.
A variable satisfying both (20) and (21) is often called a confounder , though
a more appropriate term might be unconfounder . We shall call it a sufficient
covariate.
The properties (20) and (21) are represented by the ID of Figure 8.
9.2.1 Functional model Suppose our starting point was a functional
model Y = f(T,U) (which includes (E)SE and PR models). Since the same
function is supposed to apply irrespective of the regime operating, (21) holds
trivially. We have further assumed that U has the same value, and hence the
same distribution, in all regimes, so (20) holds. That is, formally at least, U
is an unconfounder. However, in such a formulation the variable U is typically
unobservable (this being a logical necessity in the PR approach, where U is the
pair Y of potential responses), which limits the operational usefulness of this
observation.
9.3 Non-confounding
Specialisations of the above structure are obtained when we can assume that
either of the arrows marked a and b in Figure 8 is absent. It can readily be
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checked that in either case we will have Y ⊥⊥FT |T : no confounding. We might
call such a sufficient covariate U a non-confounder , and can safely forget that it
ever existed: we can simply apply (19).
The ID with arrow a absent represents the additional11 property T ⊥⊥U |FT :
that in every regime T is independent of U . Since this condition holds trivially
for the interventional regimes, where T is constant, it merely requires that T
be independent of U in the observational regime — that is, that the variables
U that putatively might have affected the doctor’s decision did not in fact do
so. This property would be perfectly believable if the doctor had tossed a coin
to determine his decision, which is why randomised studies can directly address
causal queries. But in the case of an observational study, we would need to make
some alternative convincing case for this property: then (and only then) we can
treat the study as if it had been randomised. This argument is similar to that of
§ 5.1 for functional models, but — since it involves a real rather than a fictitious
variable U , and stochastic rather than deterministic relationships — supplies a
more operational justification for assuming “no confounding”.
The ID with b absent represents the additional property Y ⊥⊥U |T , which says
that the conditional distribution of Y given (T,U) (which, by (21), has already
been supposed the same in all regimes) does not in fact depend on U : that is, U
is not predictive of outcome. In that case, even if U is associated with treatment
assignment, this will not generate confounding.
11i.e., over and above properties (21) and (20).
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9.4 Deconfounding
More generally, suppose U is a sufficient covariate that is observed in the obser-
vational regime. Define
SCEU := E(Y |U,FT = 1)− E(Y |U,FT = 0), (22)
the specific causal effect of treatment, given U . This is a random variable, a
function of U , whose value SCEU (u) when U = u is the average treatment effect
in the subgroup of individuals having U = u.
Now T = t with probability 1 under Ft. Then using (21) we find E(Y |U,FT =
t) = E(Y |U, T = t, FT = t) = E(Y |U, T = t, FT = ∅).
12 We deduce
SCEU = E(Y |U, T = 1, FT = ∅)− E(Y |U, T = 0, FT = ∅), (23)
so that SCEU is estimable from observational data. This is a reflection of the
fact that we have no confounding conditional on U .
Also, by the “extension of the conversation” rule of probability, we have
E(Y |FT = t) = E{E(Y |U,FT = t) |FT = t}
= E{E(Y |U,FT = t) |FT = ∅}
by (20). It follows that
ACE = E(SCEU |FT = ∅). (24)
That is, for any sufficient covariate U , the overall average causal effect is the
observational expectation of the associated specific causal effect. Since, by (23),
SCEU is itself an observationally estimable quantity, formula (24) allows us to
estimate ACE whenever we can observe a sufficient covariate.
12More accurately, these identifications require an additional positivity condition
(Guo and Dawid 2010), which will typically be satisfied.
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Note that in the PR framework, where we take U = Y , SCE becomes Y1− Y0,
the “individual causal effect”, ICE. Then (24) shows that ACE = E(ICE). How-
ever since ICE is necessarily unobservable, this formal identity has no operational
content.
9.5 Effect of treatment on the treated
Suppose that I am thinking of taking aspirin, and regard myself as exchangeable
with those individuals in the data who did in fact receive aspirin — though not
necessarily with those who did not. I can then use the treated group to assess my
hypothetical expected response E(Y |FT = 1) for Y , were I to take the aspirin;
but it seems I am not in a position to assess the contrasting hypothetical expec-
tation, E(Y |FT = 0), and so cannot assess my personal “effect of treatment”.
However, in the presence of a sufficient covariate U—even if not observed—I may
be able to do so.
We define the effect of treated on the treated as
ETT := E(SCEU |T = 1, FT = ∅). (25)
That is, ETT is the average, in the observational regime, of the specific causal
effect (defined relative to U), over those individuals who did in fact receive the
asprin, T = 1 — and are thus “like me”.
It might appear that, in the presence of a choice over which sufficient co-
variate U to use in (25), that choice might affect the value of ETT. For-
tunately it turns out that this is not so, on account of the following result
(Geneletti and Dawid 2011):
Theorem 2 Suppose Pr(T = 1 |FT = ∅) > 0. Then, for any sufficient covariate
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U , ETT defined by (25) satisfies
ETT =
E(Y |FT = ∅)− E(Y |FT = 0)
Pr(T = 1 |FT = ∅)
. (26)
We have previously noted that, within the PR framework, we can formally
regard the pair Y of potential responses as a sufficient covariate. In that case the
SCE becomes the ICE, Y1−Y0, and (25) delivers ETT = E(Y1−Y0 |T = 1, FT =
∅), which is the usual PR definition of ETT. However the above argument shows
that the PR framework is inessential for defining this quantity.
Formula (26) shows that we can identify ETT whenever we can observe the
response Y in the observational regime (FT = ∅), and also in a sample of people
from whom the treatment was withheld (FT = 0). And although the definition
of ETT supposes the existence of some sufficient covariate, it is not necessary to
have observations on it.
9.6 Reduction of sufficient covariate
Suppose U is a sufficient covariate. A function V of U is a sufficient reduction of
U if V is itself a sufficient covariate. Since property (20) for V follows immediately
from the same property for U , we only need investigate whether property (27)
holds for V :
Y ⊥⊥FT | (V, T ). (27)
There are various additional conditions we can impose to ensure this. One is
the following:
Condition 1 (Treatment-sufficient reduction)
T ⊥⊥U | (V, FT = ∅). (28)
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That is, in the observational regime, the choice of treatment depends on U only
through the value of V .
Note that this condition does not involve the outcome variable Y — except for the
essential requirement that the starting variable U itself be a sufficient covariate
for the effect of T on Y . Also note that, since T is constant in any interventional
regime, (28) is equivalent to
T ⊥⊥U | (V, FT ). (29)
Also, since V is a function of U , we trivially have
V ⊥⊥FT |U, (30)
as well as
Y ⊥⊥V | (U, T, FT ). (31)
The following result now follows on applying the moralisation criterion to the
ID of Figure 9, which faithfully represents the conditional independence proper-
ties (20), (30), (29), (21) and (31), to deduce (27):
Theorem 3 Suppose U is a sufficient covariate, and let be V be a function of U
such that Condition 1 holds. Then V is a sufficient covariate.
9.6.1 Propensity score An alternative description of treatment-sufficient
reduction is as follows. Using P1, the defining property (28) can be expressed as
U ⊥⊥T | (V, FT = ∅). (32)
In this form it asserts that, in the observational regime, the conditional distri-
bution of U given V is the same, whether further conditioned on T = 0, or on
T = 1: that is to say, V is a balancing score for U (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).
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Property (32) can also be fruitfully interpreted as follows. Consider the family
Q = {Q0, Q1} comprising the pair of observational conditional distibutions for
U , given, respectively, T = 0 and T = 1. Then (32) asserts that V is a sufficient
statistic (in the usual Fisherian sense) for this family. In particular, a minimal
treatment-sufficient reduction is obtained as a minimal sufficient statistic for Q:
viz., any (1, 1)-function of the likelihood ratio statistic Λ := q1(X)/q0(X). We
might term such a minimal treatment-sufficient covariate a propensity variable,
since one form for it is the treatment-assignment probability
Π := Pr(T = 1 |U,FT = ∅) = piΛ/(1 − pi + piΛ) (33)
(where pi := Pr(T = 1 |FT = ∅)), which is known as the propensity score
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Either Λ or Π supplies a 1-dimensional sufficient
reduction of the orginal, perhaps highly multivariate, sufficient covariate U .13
9.7 do-calculus
We here make use of the notation of Pearl (2009) in which e.g. p(y |x, zˇ) refers
to Pr(Y = y |X = x, FZ = z), it being implicit that z 6= ∅, and all unmentioned
intervention variables are idle.
Let X, Y , Z, W be arbitrary sets of variables in a problem also involving
intervention variables. The following rules follow immediately from the definition
of conditional independence.14
Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations) If Y ⊥⊥Z | (X,FX 6= ∅,W ) then
p(y | xˇ, z, w) = p(y | xˇ, w). (34)
13However, this property may not be as useful as may first appear (Guo and Dawid 2010).
14We assume throughout any positivity conditions required to ensure that the relevant con-
ditional probabilities are well-defined.
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Rule 2 (Action/observation exchange) If Y ⊥⊥FZ | (X,FX 6= ∅, Z,W ), then
p(y | xˇ, zˇ, w) = p(y | xˇ, z, w). (35)
Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions) If Y ⊥⊥FZ | (X,FX 6= ∅,W ), then
p(y | xˇ, zˇ, w) = p(y | xˇ, w). (36)
Successive application of these rules, coupled with the property FX = x ⇒
X = x and the laws of probability, can sometimes allow one to express a “causal”
expression in purely observational terms. This was the essence of the argument
in § 9.2 above, which (assuming for simplicity that all variables are discrete) can
be expressed in general terms as:
Theorem 4 (Back-door formula) Suppose that
Z ⊥⊥ FX (37)
Y ⊥⊥ FX | (X,Z). (38)
Then
p(y | xˇ) =
∑
z
p(y |Z = z,X = x) p(Z = z). (39)
The most usual application of this do-calculus is for a model represented by a
Pearlian DAG. However it is easiest to work with the augmented DAG.15 We first
note that conditioning on FX 6= ∅ has the effect of removing all arrows incoming
to the set X other than from FX . The resulting reduced DAG can then be interro-
gated, using the usual moralisation criterion, to deduce conditional independence
properties that can be used as input to Rules 1–3.16 In this context it can be shown
15Pearl’s analysis, like its precursor in Spirtes et al. (1999), works with equivalent, somewhat
more complex, formulations in terms of unaugmented DAGs.
16In fact Rule 1 is now redundant.
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constructively (Shpitser and Pearl 2006a; Shpitser and Pearl 2006b; Huang and Valtorta 2006)
that, whenever there exists a reduction of a causal expression to purely observa-
tional terms, it can be found by applying the do-calculus.
10 Instrumental Variables
In the presence of an unobserved sufficient covariate U , it is typically not pos-
sible to estimate the average causal effect, ACE, of a treatment variable X on
a response variable Y from observational data. Some progress can be made if
we can assume the existence of an observable instrumental variable Z, which
can be thought of as an imperfect proxy for an intervention. The assump-
tions required in such a case are typically expressed in informal terms such as
(Martens et al. 2006):
(i). Z has a causal effect on X
(ii). Z affects the outcome Y only through X (“no direct effect of Z on Y ”)
(iii). Z does not share common causes with the outcome Y (“no confounding of
the effect of Z on Y ”).
These might be formalised as observational conditional independence properties,
such as:
X 6⊥⊥ Z (40)
U ⊥⊥ Z (41)
Y ⊥⊥ Z | (X,U). (42)
Note the analogy between (41) and (20), and (42) and (21), where (with T rela-
belled as X) Z takes the place of FX . However, unlike the case of an imposed
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intervention, Z does not determine the value of X, but merely has some asso-
ciation with it, as described by (40). These assumptions are represented by the
DAG of Figure 10.17
For all that this might be a fruitful analogy, requirements (40)–(42), and
Figure 10, leave something to be desired: since they relate solely to the ob-
servational regime, they can not, of themselves, have any causal consequences —
at best these are left implicit, which leaves room for confusion. It is far better
to make the requisite causal assumptions explicit. We do this by elaborating
Figure 10 to explicitly include the nonstochastic regime indicator FX for X, as in
Figure 11. For FX = ∅ this recovers the assumptions encoded in Figure 10; but
in addition it relates the observational structure to what would happen under
an intervention to set X. In particular, it clarifies that U is assumed to be a
sufficient covariate for the effect of X on Y , and further encodes:18
U ⊥⊥ Z | FX (43)
Y ⊥⊥ Z | (X,U,FX ). (44)
Properties (44) and (43) extend (41) and (42) to apply under intervention, as
well as observationally.
10.1 Linear model
Suppose now all the observables are univariate, and we can describe the depen-
dence of Y on (X,U) (which we have assumed the same in all regimes) by a linear
model:
E(Y |X,U,FX ) =W + β X (45)
17For (40), we need to assume that this is a faithful representation.
18Figure 11 also encodes the additional, but inessential, property Z⊥⊥FX .
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for some function W of U .
We deduce
E(Y |FX = x) = w0 + β x,
where w0 := E(W |FX = x) is a constant independent of x, since U ⊥⊥FX .
Thus β can be interpreted causally, as describing how the mean of Y changes in
response to manipulation of X. Our aim is to identify β.
By (44), (45) is also E(Y |X,Z,U, FX = ∅). Then
E(Y |Z,FX = ∅) = E(W |Z,FX = ∅) + β E(X |Z,FX = ∅).
But by (43) the first term on the right-hand side is constant. Thus
E(Y |Z,FX = ∅) = constant + β E(X |Z,FX = ∅). (46)
Equation (46) relates two functions of Z, each of which can be identified from
observational data. Consequently (so long as neither side is constant) we can
identify the causal parameter β from such data. Indeed it readily follows from
(46) that (in the observational regime) β = Cov(Y,Z)/Cov(X,Z), which can be
estimated by the ratio of the coefficients of Z in the sample linear regressions of
Y on Z and of X on Z.
10.2 Binary variables
When all the observable variables Z,X, Y are binary, without making further
assumptions we can not fully identify the “causal probability” P (Y = 1 |FX = x)
from observational data. However, we can develop inequalities it must satisfy.
This approach was instigated by Manski (1990). His inequalities were refined by
Balke and Pearl (1997), under the strong additional condition of deterministic
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dependence19 of X on (Z,U) and of Y on (X,U). This condition was shown
to be unnecessary by Dawid (2003), where a fully stochastic decision-theoretic
approach was developed. In either approach, the analysis involves subtle convex
duality arguments.
11 Dynamic Treatment Strategies
In the ID of Figure 12, the L’s represent attributes of a patient, the T ’s treatments
that can be applied, and Y a response of interest. These variables are supposed
generated in the order shown, each in response to all its predecessors. The non-
stochastic regime indicator node σ can take value ∅, indicating the observational
regime; otherwise, a value σ = s describes a hypothetical treatment strategy ,
specifying how treatment T1 should be chosen in response to observation of L1,
and how T2 should be chosen in response to observation of (L1, T1, L2). Typically
such a strategy will prescribe deterministic choices, but there is no difficulty in
allowing further randomisation. The task is to infer the consequence, E(Y |σ =
s), of such a hypothetical strategy from properties of the observational regime
σ = ∅.
Figure 12 encodes the following conditional independencies:
L1 ⊥⊥ σ (47)
L2 ⊥⊥ σ | (L1, T1) (48)
Y ⊥⊥ σ | (L1, T1, L2, T2). (49)
Condition (49), for example, says that the distribution of Y , given the previous
variables (L1, T1, L2, T2), in the observational regime σ = ∅ would also apply
19An alternative interpretation of this condition is in terms of potential outcomes.
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under the operation of an imposed strategy σ = s. This is a “no residual con-
founding” type of assumption, that might or might not be appropriate. When
(47)–(49) apply, we say we have sequential ignorability .
We will always have
p(l1, t1, l2, t2, y |σ = s) = p(l1 |σ = s) (50)
× p(t1 | l1, σ = s) (51)
× p(l2 | l1, t1, σ = s) (52)
× p(t2 | l1, t1, l2, σ = s) (53)
× p(y | l1, t1, l2, t2, σ = s). (54)
Now (51) and (53) are specified by the strategy s. Also, under sequential ig-
norability, in (50), (52) and (54) we can replace σ = s by σ = ∅, so that
those terms are estimable from observational data. We will thus have all the
ingredients needed to identify the joint distribution of all variables under the
strategy σ = s, and then by marginalisation we can identify the desired conse-
quence, E(Y |σ = s). This computation, which can be effectively restructured
as a recursion (Dawid and Didelez 2010), reduces to the g-computation formula
of Robins (1986). That paper (see also Chakraborty and Murphy (2014)) set the
problem up in a PR framework, assuming the simultaneous existence of potential
responses (L1s, L2s, Ys) for each possible strategy σ = s, subject to certain consis-
tency requirements, sequential ignorability then being expressed as a conditional
independence property involving these potential responses. Our DT approach is
more straightforward to interpret, justify and implement, as well as allowing for
randomised strategies.
It will often be unrealistic to impose the “no residual confounding” assump-
48 A. P. Dawid
tions of sequential ignorability, at least without further justification. Such an
assumption might become more reasonable when additional variables are added
to the system: variables that could not, however, be usable by the considered
strategy σ = s. In such a case it is possible to add further conditions, gener-
alising those of § 9.3, which when acceptable would imply that we will indeed
have sequential ignorability. For further details see Dawid and Didelez (2010);
Dawid and Constantinou (2014).
12 Discussion
The decision-theoretic language for causality has sometimes been criticised for
not being as rich as that of alternative approaches, such as PR models, which
can make statements, in their own mathematical terms, that simply have no DT
counterpart. I regard this as a strength, not a weakness: formal mathematical
expressions (for example, the variance of the ICE—see § 3.4) that do not relate
directly to features of the real world are at best unnecessary, and at worst danger-
ously misleading. Within DT we are not plagued with “the fundamental problem
of causal inference” (Holland 1986), which is only a self-created problem of the
PR approach. The DT approach also fosters healthy scepticism of other meth-
ods, such as “principal stratification” (Frangakis and Rubin 2002), that depend
crucially on the philosophically perplexing assumption of the real simultaneous
existence of potential response pairs (Dawid and Didelez 2012), together with
necessarily untestable assumptions about their properties. Within the ambit of
problems that are well-posed, the DT framework has all the expressive power
necessary, uncluttered by unnecessary and distracting formal mathematical in-
gredients.
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Figure 1: Directed graph D for criminal evidence
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Figure 2: Ancestral subgraph D′
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Figure 3: Moralised ancestral subgraph G′
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Figure 4: No confounding: X causes Y
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Figure 5: X does not cause Y
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Figure 6: A probabilistic DAG
BA
E
DC
A
F
F
FD
FB
C
E
F
Figure 7: Augmented DAG
T
a b
YTF
U
Figure 8: Sufficient covariate
Figure 9: Treatment-sufficient reduction
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Figure 11: Instrumental variable with regimes
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Figure 12: Sequential ignorability
